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I.

INTRODUCTION

What if we could be sure that every suspect claiming to be
innocent was lying? What if we could tell that every witness was
telling the truth? Companies like NoLie MRI purport to be able to
do exactly that through functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
651
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(fMRI). Proponents of fMRI lie detection believe that brain scans
can definitively show us whether a person is lying, making
“neurolaw” the new new thing in the world of scientific evidence.
The development of fMRI technology has prompted legal
scholars and lawyers to advocate neuroscience as the latest legal
frontier. This suggests that neuroscience will provide solutions to
the age-old questions of detecting deception, assigning criminal
responsibility, and rethinking punishment strategies. Relying on
the pictures of brain function that fMRI produces, legal scholars
began publishing thousands of articles and books about “Neurolaw.”
The MacArthur Foundation generously funded a “Law and
Neuroscience Project.” 1 Prestigious law schools are establishing law
and neuroscience centers. 2 Conferences on neurolaw are
ubiquitous. 3 After the publication of studies purporting to show
different patterns of brain activity for truth-telling and lying, two
firms leaped to advertise neuroscience-based lie detection services. 4
While there are relatively few legal cases involving fMRI-based
neuroscience, 5 and courts have appropriately excluded fMRI-based
lie detection testimony in the few cases where it was proffered, the
debates about how neuroscience should inform legal decisions still
rage. These debates will continue until legal actors begin to
understand the capabilities and limitations of the methodology at
issue.
Unquestionably, brain science has progressed enormously in
the past few decades. 6 A great deal of this progress stems from the
1. See Francis X. Shen, The Law and Neuroscience Bibliography: Navigating
the Emerging Field of Neurolaw, 38 INT’L J. LEGAL INFO. 352, 357 (2010) (noting
the explosion of law and neuroscience and the MacArthur Foundation’s $10
million investment in the Law and Neuroscience Project).
2. For example, Vanderbilt has established the Center for Integrative and
Cognitive Neuroscience, see cicn.vanderbilt.edu; Harvard has a Center for Law,
Brain and Behavior, see cibb.mgh.harvard.edu; Stanford has its Program for
Neuroscience and Society, see http://neuroscience.stanford.edu; the University
of Pennsylvania has a Law & Neuroscience Winter School, see
neuroethics.upenn.edu.
3. The MacArthur Foundation maintains a list of neuroscience and law
conferences at www.lawneuro.org.
4. Cephos Corporation and NoLie MRI both marketed fMRI-based lie
detection as early as 2006. See Shen, supra note 1 at 357.
5. The published cases, of course, may reflect only a subset of those cases in
which fMRI and other brain imaging techniques have been proffered. In
addition, neuroscience may be involved in pre-trial decisions and in decisions
about prosecution and parole that are outside the reporters’ purview.
Nonetheless, the reported cases are remarkably few and far between.
6. The development of brain research was stimulated by the formation of the
Society for Neuroscience in 1969 that now has over 37,000 members. The first
academic neuroscience training program was established at the University of
California, San Diego in 1965. The first undergraduate training program in
neuroscience was established at Amherst in 1972. Today, there are more than
300 departments and programs around the world. See, e.g., M. GLICKSTEIN,
NEUROSCIENCE: A HISTORICAL INTRODUCTION (2014).
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development of fMRI. 7 Clinicians now use brain scans to diagnose
tumors, strokes, dementia and other functional abnormalities, and
to map surgical pathways (e.g., to avoid language centers when
removing a brain tumor). Certainly, the legal field should keep up
with these developments. Resolving disputes in the real world
requires knowledge of how that world works. But most of the
massively increased legal attention to fMRI research is founded on
a misconception about what the technology is capable of showing. 8
While this article acknowledges and applauds the amazing
advances of neuroscience (one of us—Garcia-Rill—is, after all, a
practicing neuroscientist), the authors would like to sound a note of
caution.
Although fMRI is indeed an astounding technology, producing
attractive colored pictures of oxygenated blood flow changes in the
brain superimposed on a two- or three-dimensional map of the
brain, interpreting these images is not as simple as it appears.
These images are not photos of the brain in action; they are
statistically built representations of blood flow changes believed to
be associated with brain activity. What that activity means is far
from understood.
In addition, while fMRI pictures appear to demonstrate the
scanned individual’s brain activity, that appearance is deceptive.
Although these images are purported to demonstrate the brain
activity of an individual, fMRI images are actually averages; they
reflect the algebraic summation of multiple episodes of brain
activity. Nearly all the fMRI deception studies 9 look at differences
in responses of groups of individuals. To say anything about a
particular individual in that group requires the use of statistical
algorithms that are themselves highly controversial. Drawing
inferences about an individual from an fMRI image is fraught with
difficulties that have not yet been overcome. 10
Interpreting the fMRI images requires an understanding of the
methodology and the technology, including the computer
programming that is used to produce them, and the assumptions
that go into the algorithms used to interpret them. Although the
visually arresting fMRI images may appear highly useful to defense
7. Magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) is used in radiology to investigate the
anatomy of the body, using magnetic fields and radio waves to compute these
images. Functional MRI (fMRI) measures changes in blood oxygenation levels
rather than static anatomical images.
8. As will be discussed below, fMRI does not directly measure brain activity,
but the responses in blood oxygenation levels, which may or may not reflect
increases or decreases in brain activity.
9. By “fMRI deception studies” we mean a number of investigations into the
brain responses generated by subjects telling the truth versus being deceptive.
10. See Francis X. Shen & Owen D. Jones, Brain Scans as Evidence: Truths,
Proofs, Lies and Lessons, 62 MERCER L. REV. 861, 866 (2011) (discussing the
absence of data on the question of whether fMRI can detect lies at the individual
subject level).
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lawyers who wish to demonstrate their clients’ truthfulness, brain
defect, or lack of intent (or to government actors intent on detecting
deception), it is not so straightforward. The links between brain
activation, blood flow, and behavior are far too tenuous to draw
inferences about individual behavior.
The basis for fMRI lie-detection is a series of studies concluding
that people asked to lie in the scanner have a different pattern of
brain activity than when they are telling the truth. 11 There are
numerous problems with these conclusions, as Part II will
demonstrate. Thus, fMRI-based lie detection is not reliable enough
to be used in court. As Part II explains in describing how fMRI
works, presumed activity in activated brain areas does not
necessarily mean that the subject is lying; the activity could be
attributable to many other factors.
In addition, the repetition and averaging required by the fMRI
process means that it is not possible to pinpoint the response to any
particular question. Further, because of significant anatomical
variation, individual scans cannot be compared; the most studies
can say is that a group of individuals differs from another group in
their averaged response. Moreover, different laboratories use
slightly different methods for acquiring, refining, and analyzing an
image. They each practice the “art” slightly differently, making use
of these images in legal proceedings problematic. Part III assesses
the claims made for neuroscience-based lie detection in the cases in
which it has been proffered. This section analyzes the courts’
responses to the proffered evidence and suggests that, although the
courts rejected the testimony, they did so in a way that leaves the
courts open to future mistakes. Part IV addresses the use of
neuroimaging for legal purposes other than lie detection, such as in
mitigation, to demonstrate lack of intent in criminal cases, or its use
in civil litigation. Part V addresses the future of neuroscience
techniques other than fMRI that might more accurately pinpoint
brain activity. Part VI concludes that the current capability of brain
imaging to inform our understanding of human thought and
behavior has been wildly over-sold.

11. See Paul S. Applebaum, The New Lie Detectors: Neuroscience, Deception,
and the Courts, 58 PSYCH. SERV. 460, 461 (2007) (discussing fMRI studies).
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II. HOW LIE DETECTORS WORK
A. Polygraph Lie Detectors
The polygraph lie detector was based on four measures: a) the
galvanic skin response that basically measured changes in the
conductivity of the skin in response to changes in peripheral blood
flow; b) pulse or heart rate variation; c) blood pressure changes; and
d) respiratory changes. All of these presumably were altered by the
“stress” of lying. The procedure required an initial interview to gain
preliminary evidence to be used to determine veracity. The tester
then informed the subject on how the method works to “detect
lying,” followed by an instruction for the subject to lie deliberately,
and then the actual test of irrelevant control and “diagnostic”
questions.
Every aspect of this process has been questioned for
considerable variability and lack of reliability. 12 In addition to the
fact that the entire process has glaring opportunities for
interrogator bias and capriciousness as well as variable subject
responsiveness, the measures are all indirect indications of brain
function. For example, the interrogator assumes that the changes
in heart rate, respiration, and galvanic skin response are direct
measures of a complex brain process. These readouts, however, are
remote consequences of what the person was thinking, feeling,
remembering, and worrying about at the time. They may not bear a
direct causal relationship to telling a lie. These measures do not
assess brain activity directly or, for that matter, on a moment-tomoment basis—they only reflect peripheral autonomic responses.
Although proponents claim accuracies of lie detection of 90%, the
United States National Research Council discredited the polygraph
lie detector for absence of reliability, application to only limited
populations, and potential for false positives. 13
Enter the fMRI method now being heralded as a more
scientific, brain-based lie detector. A host of fMRI studies, much like
the polygraph, boast up to 90% accuracy in lie detection. 14 However,
12. UNITED STATES NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE POLYGRAPH AND
LIE DETECTION 212 (2003).
13. See id., Chapter 8.
14. See Nobuhito Abe et al., Neural Correlates of True Memory, False
Memory and Deception, CEREBRAL CORTEX 2811–19 (2008); S. Bhatt et al.,
Lying About Facial Recognition: An fMRI Study, 69 BRAIN & COGNITION 382–
390 (2008); Davatzikos et al., 2005; Matthias Gamer et al., Covariations Among
fMRI, Skin Conductance, and Behavioral Data during Processing of Concealed
Information, 28 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 1287–1301 (2007); G. Ganis et al.,
Neural Correlates of Different Types of Deception: An fMRI Investigation, 13
CEREBRAL CORTEX 830–36 (2003); G Ganis, et al., Lying in the Scanner: Covert
Countermeasures Disrupt Deception Detection by Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, 55 NEUROIMAGE 312–19 (2011); F. Andrew Kozel et al., A
Pilot Study of Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of
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these assertions arise exclusively from studies on laboratory
subjects under controlled conditions. These highly controlled
studies generally prompted the investigators to conclude that there
were differences in brain activation in the “lie” condition compared
to the “truth” condition. A number of these studies have addressed
various issues such as directing subjects to lie, using situational,
object, playing card, or facial recognition protocols, and differing
experimental variations, including mock thefts.
In general, these studies find increased signal in the “lie”
condition in certain regions of the cortex, usually prefrontal and
cingulate cortex 15, but a number of other regions have also been
implicated. The technology produces colored patterns of activity
over the brain surface when the subject is lying that are different
from the activity patterns when the subject is telling the truth. The
complexity of the method, coupled with “activity” presumably being
generated by the brain and the pretty pseudocolor pictures (the
colors are from a selected spectrum and the intensity of the color is
displayed in relation to an arbitrary scale) tend to lull the
uninformed into believing that the claims made are “scientific.”
But these claims can only be evaluated by understanding what
data the fMRI records, how the pretty pictures are generated, and
what allows the conclusion that a subject is lying versus telling the
truth. To evaluate the claims for fMRI lie detection, the technology

Deception in Healthy Young Men, 16 J. NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCI.
295–305 (2004); F. Andrew Kozel, et al., A Replication Study of the Neural
Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAVIORAL NEUROSCIENCE 852–56 (2005); Daniel
D. Langleben et al., Brain Activity During Simulated Deception: An EventRelated Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15 NEUROIMAGE 727–32 (2002);
Daniel D. Langleben, et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual Subjects with
Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUMAN BRAIN MAPPING 262–72 (2005); Tatia M.
Lee et al., Are Errors Differentiablefrom Deceptive Responses When Feigning
Memory Impairment? An fMRI Study, 69 BRAIN & COGNITION 406–12 (2009);
Feroze B. Mohamed et al., Brain Mapping of Deception and Truth Telling about
an Ecologically Valid situation: Functional MR Imaging and Ponygraph
Investigation—Initial Experience, 238 RADIOLOGY 679–88 (2006); George T.
Monteleone, et al., Detection of Deception Using fMRI: Better than Chance, But
Well Below Perfection 4 SOC. NEUROSCI. 528 (2009); Izuru Nose et al., Disclosing
Concealed Information on the Basis of Cortical Activations, 44 NEUROIMAGE
380–86 (2009); Jennifer M. Nunez et al., Intentional False Responding Shares
Neural Substrates with Response Conflict and Cognitive Control, 25
NEUROIMAGE 267–77 (2005); Sean A. Spence et al., Behavioral and functional
Anatomical Correlates of Deception in Humans, 12 NEUROREPORT 2849–53
(2001); Sean A. Spence et al., Speaking of Secrets and Lies: The Contribution of
Ventrolateral Prefrontal Cortex to Vocal Deception, 40 NEUROIMAGE 1411–18
(2008).
15. The prefrontal cortex is located at the front of the brain behind the
forehead. It is thought to participate in planning behavior, decision-making,
and what are known as “executive functions.” The cingulate cortex is located on
the medial part of the hemisphere wrapping around the corpus callosum, the
main fiber pathway linking the two hemispheres. It is part of the limbic system,
which participates in emotional responses, learning, and memory.
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involved needs to be understood, the methodology behind the
generation of images must be clarified, and the process behind the
acquisition of the images revealed. These issues require detailed
explanation before fMRI lie detection ever can be considered for
judicial proceedings.

B. What Does the fMRI Measure?
MRI is a useful way to visualize regions of the cortex in detail,
particularly in pathological conditions. The MRI has advantages
over other clinical diagnostic measures in that it does not use
radiation, as do X-rays, Computed Tomography (CT), or Positron
Emission Tomography (PET) scans. Therefore, the MRI presents
virtually no risk to the patient. The fMRI can evaluate blood flow in
the cortex safely, noninvasively, and effectively. The MRI is an
excellent diagnostic tool that, given enough time to acquire the
image, provides a useful image of the pathological condition,
whether it is a tumor, stroke, or other damage. 16
Despite its many benefits, the MRI has limitations. For
example, it cannot assess internal or deep brain structures such as
the striatum, thalamus, and brainstem. 17 It only can provide images
of the cortex overlying the rest of the brain. Also, the MRI can secure
an image only if the subject being scanned lies completely still, as
any movement can introduce alterations in the image and decrease
resolution. For example, under clinical use, movements such as
excessive blinking, jaw and mouth movements, or mild tremor will
degrade the quality of the image. Clinicians resolve these problems
by prolonging the scanning time through repeated sampling and by
omitting images with movement artifact from the final average.
This requirement is not a major impediment in imaging a patient
with a potentially fatal condition since they are likely to be
cooperative, but may become prohibitive in uncooperative subjects.
Knowledge of this factor could easily be used to defeat any criminal
or judicial application.
The MRI also requires that the subject not be claustrophobic
since the cylinder is confining and the process is quite loud. This
introduces a potential variable among individuals who might suffer

16. The MRI allows anatomical verification of structural changes due to
disease, especially tumors and stroke, while the fMRI can assess the blood flow
to a particular anatomical region, providing a more “functional” measure.
17. The striatum is located immediately beneath the cortex and is a major
component of the basal ganglia, a group of centers in charge of motor planning,
sensory filtering, and executive functions. The thalamus is located deep to the
striatum and relays sensory and motor signals from the ascending pathways to
the cortex, and from the cortex to descending pathways. The brainstem
regulates sleep, maintains consciousness, and regulates cardiac and respiratory
functions.
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from degrees of this condition. Thus, varying feelings of distress
might be misinterpreted. The fact that some subjects are initially
anxious may prevent scans from being compared across individuals
since they have different baseline conditions. The polygraph lie
detector is similar limitations since only some individuals showed
clear autonomic responses when lying (or when fearful that they
would be labeled a liar), while others simply beat the lie detector by
being calm and practicing their deceit.
The most significant limitation, however, is that the MRI does
not assess neuronal activity 18 directly; it measures blood flow as a
consequence of presumed neuronal activity. The fMRI is based on
the concept that blood that is carrying oxygen behaves differently
from blood that has already released its oxygen into the tissues. 19
Higher-oxygenated blood emits a different signal than loweroxygenated blood. Simply put, the machine aims radio waves at
protons, which are electrically charged particles in the nuclei of
hydrogen atoms. When the radio waves hit the protons, the protons
align, and then the machine emits a burst of radio waves that
knocks the protons out of alignment. When the protons fall back in
line, or “relax,” they emit a signal that the scanner can then detect.
The protons in higher-oxygenated hemoglobin in the blood emit
stronger signals than those from less-oxygenated blood. The
difference in the signal between oxygenated (HbO2) and
deoxygenated (Hb) hemoglobin is only about 3%. This very small
difference in signal is what is being calculated to provide an image.
In order to detect such a small signal, the process requires
repetition and averaging. That means that one cannot ask a
question at one specific point in time in order to assess the veracity
of the response. 20 The best procedure is to ask a series of questions
over a period of time, perhaps as long as 20–40 minutes, that could,
in theory, be interpreted as being deceptive or not. This is a huge
problem for the use of fMRI in lie detection, where the issue is
invariably whether the answer to a particular question at a
particular moment was truthful.
The fMRI measures this difference in blood oxygenation (which
presumably reflects brain activity) through computer calculations
mapped on a three-dimensional image of the brain while color-coded
intensities of the signals emitted are displayed across the brain
18. That is, it does not measure the firing of neurons or the synaptic inputs
by transmitters onto other neurons, rather it measures the changes in blood
flow that result from such activity, probably for restoring energy stores
following neuronal activity.
19. See Peter A. Bandettini, Functional MRI Limitations and Aspirations,
15, 16 NEURAL CORRELATES OF THINKING (E. Kraft, et al., eds. 2009)
(explaining the mechanism of fMRI).
20. See, e.g., United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012) (where
the expert could not say which questions the defendant had answered
truthfully, but only that the defendant had been generally truthful in answering
the questions).
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surface. The computation assumes that blood in vessels and
capillaries flows in one direction, but this may not be true. Blood
can flow in both directions in small capillaries.
The more “active” in terms of neuronal activity the brain
regions are, the more blood flows. This leads to brighter intensity of
the colors in these regions.
This technology is excellent for mapping the extent of strokes
or tumors in an individual subject when there are no time
constraints. It can accurately map a given structure given repeated
scanning. The fMRI technician generates an image based on a series
of calculations each of which has decision points to “optimize” the
image. That is, the fMRI technician makes decisions that can
impact what the final image looks like. Such decisions can impact
the use of these images in legal proceedings. One question is, does
the fMRI technician become a “witness”? Throughout the imaging
process there are opportunities for subjective judgments that may
alter the image, making the generation of these colorful images as
much art as they are science.

C. The Method
1. Scanning Time
Although scanning time is not an issue for clinical applications,
outside of the clinical setting, the issue of temporal resolution is
quite daunting. Typically, whole brain images are acquired with a
repetition time of 2 seconds, and a time series is generated so that
a single image represents activity over 5–8 minutes. A typical
experiment involves several (5–10) of these time series per session,
requiring as many as 12 sessions, or about 45–60 minutes for a
single scan. The prolonged period required to detect a difference
between conditions means that any process measured is one
influenced by brain activity over many minutes. This makes it
unfeasible to assess the veracity of the response to a single question.
Using this technology, the most that can be said is that over
the course of the session, the person in the scanner was being
“deceptive” or not. However, since so many thoughts, memories,
ideas, and random events generate activity in the brain, one cannot
definitively conclude that is was deception versus anxiety versus
other processes that were evoked during the session. The time
course used for clinical purposes is intended to generate images that
are as clear as possible; for this, the clinician needs repetition,
multiple series of scans, and multiple sessions. The time course
required as lie detection represents two serious technological
problems: first, imprecision in pinpointing when the response is
occurring; and second, each repetition generates a lower signal.
To explain: studies by Kozel and others found that withinsubject analysis of “Lie” versus “True” generated large variations in

660

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:651

areas of significant flow across the group. 21 The variability was
attributed to the low number of epochs (an epoch is a series of
repetitions) (n=8) used to derive averages of the condition Lie versus
True. This suggests that more epochs need to be averaged to
decrease noise. Multiple repetitions in the order of minutes may be
required to achieve reliable images of True versus Lie conditions.
This begs the question: at what point in time during all those
repetitions is the “lie” occurring? For example, if someone is
thinking about walking on the beach while being questioned, will
that affect the result? Further, as we will see in the next section,
the blood flow signal decreases with repetition or practice, so that
simply repeating the same question will not produce a clearer
signal.
2. Image Subtraction
When doing fMRI research to detect cognitive activity, the
“control” image generated in a baseline condition is compared—
usually subtracted from—a second scan generated during the “test”
condition. That is, a “control” image generated over tens of minutes
is algebraically subtracted from one generated over the same period
of time in the “test” condition. The fundamental concept in
functional neuroimaging is the statistical comparison of what is
expected to happen to the hemodynamic (blood flow) response in
relation to a defined function. 22
Applying such a protocol to the judicial process introduces a
number of interpretative problems. What does it mean when the
image is generated over such an extended period of time? At what
point in time is the “difference” between the “truth” and the “lie”
condition detected? For example, if a suspect or defendant is
scanned for 8 minutes and asked a series of questions during that
time, to some of which the answers are lies, is the final image really
a representation of the lie or is it contaminated by tens or even
hundreds of thoughts, sensations, and virtual motions over the
prolonged scanning time? What happens if the defendant is
thinking about his foundering love affair, his vacation, or something
else?
What is the relationship between what amounts to an
“averaged” blood flow signal and a second “averaged” blood flow
signal at some later time? Most neuroimaging studies do not provide
a formal analysis that ensures that the particular cognitive process;
21. See F. Andrew Kozel, et al., A Pilot Study of Functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging Brain Correlates of Deception in Healthy Young Men, 16 J.
NEUROPSYCHIATRY CLIN. NEUROSCI. 295–305 (2004).
22. See Bandettini, supra note 19, at 18 (noting that the “fundamental
concept in all of functional imaging creation is the statistical comparison of what
is expected to happen in the hemodynamic response, as defined by a ‘reference’
function or a ‘regressor,’ with the data, on a voxelwise basis”).
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e.g., Lie versus True, is being isolated by the subtraction. 23 At best,
it could be said that at some point in time the blood flow changed.
But it is not at all clear that the change was caused by telling the
truth versus lying. Extraneous thoughts or mood changes could
cause such changes.
Because brain speeds are quite rapid, the ideal process would
be to ask a question and obtain a response within a second or so.
The perception of a simple visual, auditory, or cutaneous input has
a latency of about 200 milliseconds. 24 The reaction time to a simple
auditory or visual stimulus is in the order of 150 to 300 milliseconds.
However, reaction time to complex verbal stimuli requires more
processing and can occur 1–2 seconds after the command. One
question that arises is when does the brain signal change after a
question is posed. If there is a significant latency to the change in
activity, is the activity being measured a consequence of the posing
of the question or of the response to the question? None of these
questions can be definitively answered.
3. Latency
Such problems might be partly resolved by fast scanning of
only a single brief event, without “averaging” over multiple scans,
series of scans, and sessions. Recent advances are using scanning
times of hundreds of milliseconds, with higher magnetic field
strengths that increase resolution. 25 It is then important to
determine what is being scanned during these brief exposures, how
much resolution is lost by the faster scanning, and whether a single
brief scan still requires repetitive image acquisition. At present, it
is not clear if these brief exposures represent the same or different
kind of blood flow calculated from repetitive exposures. We should
remember that current methods average many repetitions. Thus,
any one trial may not contain a response at all, or may even be
opposite in polarity—that is, a decrease instead of an increase in
signal. Averaging accumulates many trials, and it is the algebraic
23. See Nikos K. Logothetis, What We Can Do and What We Cannot Do with
fMRI, 453 NATURE 869–78 (2008).
24. K. Sekar, et al., Cortical response tracking the conscious experience of
threshold duration visual stimuli indicates visual perception is all or none, 110
PROC. NAT. ACAD. SCI. 5642–47 (2013).
25. P. S. Bellgowan et al., Improved BOLD Detection in the Medial Temporal
Region Using Parallel Imaging and Voxel Reduction 29 NEUROIMAGE 1244–51
(2006); J.Z. De Zwart et al., Signal to Noise Ratio and Parallel Imaging
Performance of a 16-channel Receive-only Brain Coil Array at 3.0 Tesla, 51
MAGN. RESON. MED. 22–26 (2004); S. Moeller et al., Application of Parallel
Imaging to fMRI at 7 Tesla Utilizing a High ID Reduction Factor, 56 MAG.
RESON. MED. 118–29 (2006); C. Preibisch et al., Comparison of Parallel
Acquisition Techniques Generalizing Autocalibrating Partially Parallel
Acquisition (GRAPPA) and Modified Sensitivity Encoding (mSENSE) in
Functional MRI at 3 T., 27 J. MAG. RESON. IMAGING 590–98 (2008).

662

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:651

summation of these trials that produces the final image. Individual
images may not show responses at all, but presumably enough trials
produce an increase that adds up to a signal in the final average.
Another issue with repetitive scanning is that the peak of the
blood flow signal occurs seconds after the brain activity. 26 After a
single event—say, exposure to a short stimulus such as an auditory
“click”—the fMRI signal begins to change a full 2 seconds after the
event. There is a “pre-undershoot” before the peak of the blood flow
signal (this means that during the 2 seconds before the peak, there
is a decrease in the signal), and a “post-undershoot” (another
decrease in the signal) that can last as long as 1 minute after the
peak. These dynamics—i.e., decrease followed by a peak followed by
another decrease—are not fully understood. 27
Importantly, the blood flow changes occur for varying periods
after the stimulus, but the peak response is approximately several
seconds after the presumed brain activity has taken place. This
delay means that the change being measured is only an indirect
measure of brain activity that occurred earlier. That is, these
changes are a measure of “post-deception” activity, not coincident
with the telling of a lie. A defense attorney could argue that these
changes occurred because the client was simply nervous about being
erroneously accused of lying.
Owing to the variations in the blood vessels in the region, it
may take up to four seconds for the hemodynamic response to
occur. 28 The type of vasculature sampled also affects the dynamics,
location, and magnitude of the signal, with large vessels
manifesting a higher amplitude signal than smaller vessels. Large
vessels therefore show more activity, or blood flow, than small ones.
The significant inter-individual differences represent a significant
impediment when comparing signals between individuals because
the size of blood vessels varies significantly across individual
brains. 29 Because the architecture of blood vessels across
individuals is so variable, scans cannot be compared between
individuals. That is, most studies can only say that a group of
individuals differed from another group in the averaged signal.
Therefore, the conclusion that fMRI can be used to detect lie from
truth applies only to group comparisons under very controlled
conditions, not to particular individuals. This is one of the most
serious shortcomings of using fMRI in legal proceedings: the
26. See Bandettini, supra note 19, at 23 (discussing temporal resolution of
fMRI).
27. R.B. Buxton & L. R. Frank, A Model for the Coupling of Cerebral Blood
Flow and Oxygen Metabolism During Neural Stimulation, 17 J. CEREB. BLOOD
FLOW 64–72 (1997); R. B. Buxton et al, Modeling the Hemodynamic Response to
Brain Activation, 23 NEUROIMAGE S220–S233 (2004).
28. Peter A. Bandettini, The Temporal Resolution of Functional MRI,
FUNCTIONAL MRI 205–220 (1999).
29. See Bandettini, supra note 19, at 23.
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inability to provide a region or signal change that can represent
“lying” across individuals.
If a person is telling a lie, assuming that there is differential
brain activity, how long is the differential brain activity, if any,
present? Can an individual tell a lie and its effects wane in less than
two seconds? Do the consequences of telling a lie leave a trail of
brain activity that lasts more than two seconds? This limits the
ability of the fMRI to detect a lie immediately after a single
question, which in turn limits its usefulness in legal proceedings.
4. Resolution
Another unresolved issue for fMRI lie detection is spatial
resolution. Original scans sampled a region of 4x4x4 millimeters,
but better software and methodology have increased the resolution
of scans to the 1–3 millimeter range. Spatial resolution is measured
in voxels, a combination of “volume” and “pixel” that represents a
value on a regular grid in three-dimensional space. The smallest
voxel that can be measured is a function of the strength of the MRI
magnet. Higher resolution and higher sensitivity are achieved by
higher magnetic strengths. The magnetic field strength of a typical
scanner is measured in “tesla.” Most clinical scanners use 1.5 tesla
magnets and have a resolution ~ 2 millimeters. Magnets of 3 tesla
and 7 tesla improve spatial resolution to 1.5 millimeters and 0.5
millimeters for a voxel, respectively. But higher resolution and
sensitivity do not solve the problems of lie detection fMRI.
For one thing, blood flow varies within brain regions, so that
spatial changes may differ across regions. 30 Such variability may
defeat the purpose of identifying “regions” that are particularly
active in one condition versus another condition (e.g., truth versus
lie) in some individuals compared to others. It is not known if there
are specific regions involved in truth versus lie, or even if the same
or different circuits are involved. There is no such thing as the
“truth” region or the “lie” region of the cortex. The brain does not
work that way, as discussed below.
Another problem is that most fMRI studies involve “spatial
smoothing”, “spatial normalization,” and “multisubject averaging.”
This effectively reduces the spatial resolution and eliminates the
advantages of scanning at high resolution or using higher ﬁeld
magnets. 31 While this may be optimal for producing a clear image,
these manipulations require increased repetition.
Moreover, at each point in the analysis, the technician
generating the image must decide which thresholds to set and
which options to exercise in order to “clarify” the image. This
30. See Bandettini supra note 19, at 30 (observing that “hemodynamics vary
from voxel to voxel”).
31. See id. at 24–27 (discussing spatial resolution).
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“tweaking” introduces personal preference on the part of the
technician. This “tweaking” may be why two laboratories
performing the same experiment conclude that different brain
regions are involved in the same process. That is, they are each
practicing the “art” differently. Imagine three painters provided
with the same photograph being asked to independently generate
an oil painting of the person in the photograph. The individual
painters will produce vastly different renditions of the same person.
The use of this technology thus presents a problem for use in the
judicial process, which requires more standardization.
5. Brain Activity
The way brain signals are generated presents a further
interpretive issue. The brain works by receiving external inputs
that are integrated with ongoing self-generated activity. It has
constant background activity and also continuous afferent input
from the senses. Visual, auditory, and cutaneous inputs are
intermixed with internal signals from joint receptors, muscle
receptors, and tendon receptors that signal the position and tone of
our muscles. This ongoing brain activity is superimposed on
intrinsic membrane oscillations.
Brain cells have ion channels that dictate their behavior, and
these generate intrinsic oscillations. The integration of internal
intrinsic oscillations with external or sensory driven activity
triggers recurring oscillations between regions such as the cortex
and thalamus, the cortex and hippocampus, the cortex and
cerebellum, the cortex and basal ganglia.
Which regions are called into play depends on the process at
work, such as the formulation of a movement or the storing of a
memory. All of the sensory input to the brain arises from inputs to
the spinal cord and brainstem (except olfactory input, which travels
directly to the olfactory cortex). The sensory inputs (other than
olfactory) undergo some processing in sensory relay nuclei of the
brainstem before being relayed to specific parts of the thalamus.
The thalamus is therefore the first major switchboard guiding
sensory inputs and integrating them with internal membrane
oscillations.
The thalamus is a collection of cell groups that project to
separate regions of cortex. The thalamic input from the brainstem
travels to a specific region of the cortex and induces activity. That
primary input undergoes further processing by being relayed to
other regions of the cortex and back to the thalamus. For every fiber
arriving from the thalamus, the cortex sends ten fibers back to the
thalamus. The cortex therefore acts like an amplifier. The returning
wave of activity is processed by the thalamus and “bounced” back to
the cortex. This reverberation may occur for hundreds of
milliseconds before perception occurs.
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Even a simple “click” stimulus produces an astounding amount
of activity for hundreds of milliseconds before the stimulus is
perceived. Responses can be measured by electrodes placed on the
scalp that pick up the underlying activity from thousands of
neurons. This technique is known as an “evoked response” that is
recorded and averaged following the repeated delivery of a stimulus.
For example, a simple auditory “click” stimulus first produces
cortical activity in the auditory pathway that is detected by
averaging as a peak over the auditory cortex at a 25-millisecond
latency. This is known as the “Pa” evoked response.
There is another wave front of activity that arrives at 50
milliseconds also as a positive peak (known as the “P50” potential),
and reverberations that produce a negative peak at 100
milliseconds (the “N1” response), followed by positive activity at 200
milliseconds (the “P2” or “P200” potential). These various peaks and
troughs represent the sequential “bouncing” of the sensory between
the cortex and the thalamus until it is perceived at about 200
milliseconds. This reverberation is akin to striking a bell and
setting off ringing across the cortex and thalamus. The
reverberations do not just occur between the same location in the
thalamus and the same region of cortex. For example, the “Pa”
response peaks over the superior temporal cortex on the side of the
head just above the ear, but the “P50” response activates the same
region in addition to an area at the top of the head called the vertex.
The “N1” and “P2” potentials also show peaks in more than one
location. This suggests that the ringing is occurring between the
thalamus and cortex but not necessarily in the same spot; rather,
the reverberations engage multiple cortical and thalamic regions as
processing proceeds.
The fundamental question of whether there is any relationship
between such brain activity and the fMRI signal remains contested.
We simply do not know whether the signal the fMRI measures is
due to the question asked (the input), the response to the question
(output), or to the process of thinking about the question and/or the
answer. We know very little about what brain activity occurs during
fMRI scanning.
Regardless of the spatial resolution achieved, the simultaneous
use of fMRI and direct electrophysiological recording, such as those
described above, in nonhuman primate brains during single
stimulus visual stimulation suggests that the signal is more
correlated with synaptic activity (local ﬁeld potentials) than with
spiking (action potential) activity. 32 Therefore, the signal generated
relates more to the input to the region in the form of synaptic
potentials arriving at the dendrites of cells (the “sensory” or “input”
elements of neurons) than to the output of cells reflected by action
32. Nikos K. Logothetis et al., Neurophysiological Investigation of the Basis
of the fMRI Signal, 412 NATURE 150–57 (2001).
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potentials generated by the initial segment of the cell axon (the
“motor” or “output” element of the cell). 33
That presents the question of whether the differences detected
in the True versus Lie condition in fMRI tests represent the
“detection” of the lie by the region or the “computation” of the lie by
the region. Because the signal is more related to the input, the fMRI
signal would appear to be more related to detection than to
response. In other words, the brain activity taking place that best
correlates with the fMRI signal appears to be due to hearing and
assessing the question being asked—e.g., “Did you kill Fred?”—
rather than to the answer being formulated.
Simultaneous electrophysiological recordings in animal models
reveal a correlation between negative fMRI signal changes and
decreased neuronal activity. 34 Some studies showed that a decrease
in the fMRI signal correlated with a decrease in actual brain
activity. This would bode well for the use of the method if an
increase in brain activity always went along with an increase in
fMRI signal, and a decrease in brain activity always went along
with a decrease in fMRI signal. However, simultaneous
electrophysiological recordings, whether the activity of single cells
or responses of groups of cells-population responses, in animal
models also provided evidence that inhibitory input could cause an
increase in cerebral blood ﬂow. 35 Thus a region with increased fMRI
signal may actually indicate decreased brain activity.
As far as human subjects are concerned, we do not know under
what circumstances an increase in fMRI signal indicates an
increase or a decrease in brain activity. For example, an increase in
the excitation of neurons may lead to an increase in metabolism that
would then be reflected as an increase in blood flow, but an increase
in inhibition can also be metabolically demanding, and also signal
an increase in blood flow. Therefore, a technician could interpret an
increase in fMRI signal as an increase in brain activity when in fact
it is the result of a decrease in brain activity. A person relaxing from
telling the truth—which may lead to a decrease in activity that is
33. Electrophysiological recordings are methods for detecting the activity of
neurons in the brain. Very small electrodes (microelectrodes) can detect the
activity of a single nerve cell firing an action potential or “spike”. Slightly larger
electrodes can detect signals in a group of neurons and this is called a “field”
recording. Even larger electrodes such as those placed on the scalp can record
the algebraic summation of activity of hundreds of thousand s of neurons
beneath the scalp such as is done with the electroencephalogram (EEG).
34. A. Shmuel et al., Sustained Negative BOLD, Blood Flow and Oxygen
Consumption Response and its Coupling to the Positive Response in the Human
Brain, 36 NEURON 1195–1210 (2002).
35. C. Matheiesen et al., Modification of Activity-Dependent Increases of
Cerebral Blood Flow by Excitatory Synaptic Activity and Spikes in Rat
Cerebellar Cortex, 512 J. PHYSIOL. 555–66 (1998). This finding suggests that the
changes in blood flow detected with the fMRI can be due to increases OR
decreases in activity.
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reflected in an increase in fMRI signal—could be erroneously
labeled as lying.
A further complication is that fMRI signals reflect the pooled
activity of a very large number of neurons, and differences in fMRI
signals could be caused by either large changes in the firing rates
in a small subpopulation of neurons or small changes in the firing
rates in a much larger subpopulation of neurons. 36 Clearly, if
excitatory (increase activity) and inhibitory (decrease activity)
neurons are highly intermixed in the cortex, then different groups
of neurons may be activated by different tasks within a single voxel.
But if the same number is activated by different tasks, no difference
in activation will be detectable.
In some studies, there was considerable discordance between
the spatial extent of the fMRI signal and the recorded
neurophysiological signals. 37 That is, the brain activity that was
correlated with a peak in blood flow occurred at a location away
from the peak in blood flow. This may mean that the blood flow
change and the brain activity occurred independently, and that
their correlation was only in time not space. This casts further doubt
on what fMRI is measuring, especially since the blood flow signal is
only correlated to brain activity and may not be causally related.
Given this complexity, imagine what happens in the brain
when a person is asked, “Did you kill Fred?” To deliver the question
takes about half a second, or 500 milliseconds. By the time the
entire question is delivered, perception of at least the first three
words has been completed. Perceiving, however, is not the same as
understanding. Understanding requires language processing by
another cortical region, the language area over the temporal lobe.
The question itself will not be fully understood until after another
half a second or so.
A rapid response—say, “No”—probably takes another 300
milliseconds, since the motor system for speech must be engaged,
which takes time. 38 Therefore, the whole process from asking a
simple question to responding with a single syllable, at a minimum,
may take 2 seconds. The fMRI signal indicating a change in blood
flow usually occurs about 4 seconds after the response is delivered,
or double the latency. This difference in time, or 2 full seconds, is an
eternity in brain processing time. Moreover, it is not clear what
leads to the generation of the change in blood flow, since input and
output processing has already been accomplished in half the time.
What happens during the intervening time period is not known. The
36. Jack W. Scannell & Malcolm W. Young, Neuronal Population Activity
and Functional Imaging, 266 PROC. R. SOC. LOND. B. 875–81 (1999).
37. Elizabeth A. Disbrow et al, Functional fMRI at 1.5 Tesla: A Comparison
of the Blood Oxygenation level-dependent signal and Electrophysiology, 97
PNAS 9718 (2000).
38. The motor region for the mouth is located on the lateral frontal lobe, it
is called “Broca’s area.”
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fMRI change measured and attributed to the subject’s “No” could be
due to any number of other factors, none of which is well
understood.
6. Location
A fundamental goal of fMRI lie detection is to be able to infer
precisely where, when, and how much neuronal activity is taking
place in the brain on the basis of the measured signal. 39 Because the
signal changes depend on variables other than neuronal activity,
including hemodynamic coupling and volume in each voxel, this
goal is still elusive. The hemodynamics vary from voxel to voxel, so
even if a scan demonstrates that within a region there is a
relationship between neuronal activity and signal, we cannot say
what precisely the neuronal activity is in any particular voxel. To
do this, we must calibrate each voxel in relation to brain activity
across individual voxels. This, however, has never been done.
The kind of brain activity that ought to be measured is still an
open question. Is it local field potentials (the algebraic summation
of large ensembles of neurons) or action potentials (the firing of a
single neuron)? Is the region being measured acting independently
or is it part of a circuit? Is the activity in the measured region the
end result of activity in a circuit involving multiple regions? Does
that circuit always behave the same or does it change with fatigue,
stress, daydreaming, or thinking of something pleasant versus
unpleasant? The answers to these questions are not known and may
invalidate the process.

39. Haynes argues that this is not the goal of fMRI lie detection; that,
instead, the goal is to detect overall increased activity in the brain, using a
“computer-based classification algorithm.” John-Dylan Haynes, Detecting
Deception from Neuroimaging Signals—a Data-driven Perspective, 12 TRENDS
IN NEUROSCIENCE 126–27 (2008). This argument is statistically flawed,
however, because if you record enough data points you can achieve statistical
significance even with miniscule effect. See Erica Beecher-Monas, Lost in
Translation: Statistical Inference in Court, 46 A.S.U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2015)
(explaining that more data for a given effect size results in a smaller p-value—
or greater level of statistical significance). For example, “if we test all 50,000
voxels [typical of an fMRI] separately, then by chance alone, 2500 would be
expected to cross the threshold of significance at the p<0.05 level…This is
known as the problem of multiple comparisons and there is no simple solution
to it.” Martha J. Farah, Brain Images, Babies , and Bathwater: Critiquing
Critiques of Functional Neuroimaging, 44 HAST. CENT. REP. S19–S30 (2014).
An example of the multiple comparison problem is the experiment in which
researchers took a dead salmon, put it in an fMRI scanner, asked it to think
about the emotions of people displayed in photos, and found regions engaged in
perspective-taking at the 0.001 level. Craig M. Bennett et al., Neural Correlates
of Interspecies Perspective Taking in the Post-Mortem Atlantic Salon: An
Argument for Proper Multiple Comparisons Correction, 1 J. OF SERENDIPITOUS
AND UNEXPECTED RESULTS 1–5 (2010).
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D. Can Arousal Issues be Disassociated From Signals
Related to Lie Versus Truth?
Some scientists question the lack of attention that has been
paid to changes in arousal or excitability levels in the determination
of responses related to deceit. 40 In fMRI lie detection research, the
laboratory conditions of all these studies were well controlled and
the subjects were generally asked to answer or perform a very
specific task. In real world situations, in contrast, there is a
continuous ebb and flow to questioning and the interrogation
process is marked by a complex sequence of events. There have been
few studies that address the arousal level, anxiety related to the
questioning, and overall complexity of questioning under pressure.
The central assumption guiding inferences that are made from
fMRI data about neuronal activity has been that the fMRI signal is
approximately proportional to a measure of local neural activity,
averaged over a spatial extent of several millimeters, and over a
time period of several seconds. 41 This is referred to as the linear
transform model of the fMRI signal. There is, however, no reason to
suspect that blood flow will still be linear in the face of a host of
changes in excitability, anxiety shifts, and autonomic responses. It
may well be that “stress” purportedly arising from lying, or from the
fear of being perceived as lying, could induce autonomic responses
that would differ from the condition of answering truthfully.
However, the relationship between the fMRI signal and the
neuronal activity depends on the MRI acquisition method. As
described above, the fMRI signal derives from hemodynamics,
which includes blood flow, blood volume, and blood oxygenation.
This in turn depends on the distribution of large vessels, small
vessels, capillaries, and various sized veins. Variations in the fMRI
technique can emphasize or de-emphasize any of these components.
There have been few attempts at quantifying the relationships
between these techniques. 42
Attention also may vary from individual to individual and from
question to question within the testing parameters. Attentional
load can increase baseline activity and the nature of the response to
a stimulus for prolonged periods. 43 People who pay more (or less)
attention to the questions asked may be able to affect the fMRI
measurement of responses to Lie versus Truth.
40. See Logothetis, supra note 23.
41. David J. Heeger & David Ress, What Does fMRI Tell Us About Neuronal
Activity?, 3 NATURE 142 (2002).
42. Id.
43. For example, Dr. Laken, the expert in U.S. v. Semrau, explained the
fMRI results indicating that Dr. Semrau was lying based on Dr. Semrau’s
fatigue from answering questions so early in the morning, and re-tested at a
later time in the day. The court was understandably critical of this explanation
and this was one of the reasons Dr. Laken’s testimony was excluded.
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E. How are the fMRI Images Generated? Are They
“Preprocessed”?
1. Slice Timing Correction
The process of fMRI scanning acquires different images within
a single brain region at different times, so that the images represent
brain activity at different times. In order to simplify analysis, a
timing correction is applied to bring all slices of the brain region to
the same time reference. This is done by assuming that the time
course of a voxel is smooth, so that the voxel’s intensity value at
other times not in the sampled images is calculated by filling in the
values to create a continuous line. The problem with this procedure
is that the timing correction may vary across labs. The metaphor
provided above of the three painters is appropriate here. A
photograph of a girl with red hair will lead to three paintings with
different colors of hair, eyes, and skin, and her posture will likely
differ. The end result will be paintings of three girls who could be
sisters, not the same girl. The processing method “fills in” the empty
time points. That means that the images are highly manufactured
and open to independent “tweaking” by different technicians. No
single protocol exists across labs.
2. Motion Correction
To account for motion, the fMRI technician applies a rigid-body
transformation algorithm, shifting and rotating the whole volume
data, in what is called a correction. The technician statistically
compares the transformed volume to the volume at the first sample
to determine “how well they match.” Applying this “correction” is a
further example of the ways in which technician “tweaking” affects
the image. Different laboratories apply different thresholds for the
correction. Note that seeing “how well they match” is a term that
describes personal preference and is not a defined protocol. This is
another factor making the process irretrievably subjective.
3. Coregistration Algorithm
To plot the blood flow signal onto the structural image of the
brain, the fMRI process uses data derived from structural signals
and aligns these data with the magnetic field decay image signals.
Because these are two different types of signals, the resolutions of
these two types of signals are different, so that the intensity values
cannot be compared. Forcing two incompatible signals to align and
“create” an image represents another decision point in the way the
image is generated. Each decision point represents the different
personal preferences of laboratory technicians in different
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laboratories.
4. Temporal Filtering
The process of temporal filtering involves yet more subjective
decision-making. The technician uses this process to remove
frequencies (periodic waves) that are not of interest 44 by creating a
power spectrum, or Fourier Transform, of the data. Once more,
there is no standard protocol and the technician’s selection of
frequencies to be filtered is subjective and intended to obtain an
“optimal” image; that is, one with less noise that is “better looking.”
This “tweaking” is perhaps the most subjective since the technician
is mathematically manipulating the raw signal.
5. Spatial Filtering
By averaging the intensities of nearby voxels, the image is
“smoothed” using a Gaussian filter, ensuring that the points fall
along a bell curve distribution, in order to improve the image. All
of this “preprocessing” of fMRI images is marked by subjective
choices at multiple steps in the analysis. Because of the subjectivity
involved, it is highly unlikely that identical images in the same
individual could be acquired at two different machines. Even if
identical interrogation methods were followed, there are likely to be
differences between two separate machines and two different
analysts.

F. Other Factors
Learning is accompanied by a decrease in fMRI signals. 45 This
means that unfamiliar tasks will evoke more easily detectable
signals than will familiar tasks. The problem here is that repeated
scans using the same interrogation method will not generate the
same signal levels. With practice, the signal decreases. 46 In
repeated trials, the signal strength decreases. This suggests that, if
a guilty subject repeatedly practices telling a lie, the lie will be
detected as a decreased signal similar to that of a control question;
i.e., a false negative.
Finally, some researchers believe that there is no single
subject reliability, and that a scan from one subject can never be
44. The filtering process allows different labs to filter at different
frequencies. No studies are available to determine how such decisions alter the
final image, making this another aspect of the practice of the “art.”
45. M. E. Raichle, Images of the Mind: Studies with Modern Imaging
Techniques, 45 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 333–56 (1994); M. Jueptner, et al, Anatomy
of Motor Learning, 77 J. NEUROPHYSIOLOGY 1313–24 (1997).
46. S. A. HUETTEL ET AL, FUNCTIONAL MAGNETIC RESONANCE IMAGING
(2009)
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interpreted based on group data. 47 Conclusions can only be drawn
about group averages, not individual brains. This is obviously a
problem for legal applications, since the legal question nearly
always involves the individual rather than the group.

III. PART III
Neuroscience-based lie detection is not science fiction. It has
been the subject of peer-reviewed publications from several
laboratories for at least 10 years. 48 The idea is grounded on
sophisticated scientific research originating with research scientist
Daniel D. Langleben, who theorized that lying is more work (and
therefore will result in more blood flow to the brain) than telling the
truth. 49 In his initial study on this topic, Dr. Langleben concluded
that when subjects in a scanner told a lie, their brains showed more
activity than when they were telling the truth. 50 He localized the
increased activity to several regions of the brain associated with
increased attention, error monitoring, behavioral control, and
sensory input monitoring. 51 Later studies by the Langleben group
attempted to create a model that would be able to tell whether an
individual subject was lying or telling the truth. 52
A separate group of researchers also found statistically
increased brain activity in several regions of the brain when

47. Richard Robinson, fMRI Beyond the Clinic: Will it Ever Be Ready For
Prime Time?, 2 PLOSBIOLOGY 0715 (2004).
48. See Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection: The
Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J.L. & MED. 377, 390 (2007) (Noting that
fMRI lie detection “has been the subject of significant peer-reviewed literature
from several laboratories”).
49. See Daniel D. Langleben, et al., Brain Activity During Simulated
Deception: An Event-Related Functional Magnetic Resonance Study, 15
NEUROIMAGE 727, 728–29 (2002) (reporting that in a study of 18 subjects, each
given $20 and a 5 of clubs playing card, who were told that they could keep the
money if they lied about having the 5 of clubs, but not if they lied about any
other card they saw while being scanned in an fMRI scanner, blood flow
increased when they were lying).
50. Id. at 731.
51. See id. at 730–731 (noting increased activity in the anterior cingulate
cortex (associated with heightened attention and error monitoring); dorsal
lateral prefrontal cortex (behavioral control); parietal cortex (processing sensory
input)).
52. See Daniel D. Langleben, et al., Telling Truth from Lie in Individual
Subjects with Fast Event-Related fMRI, 26 HUM. BRAIN MAPPING 262, 262
(2005) (using logistic regression analysis to create a model that could tell true
answers from false ones 76.5% of the time, with a 69% specificity and 84%
sensitivity); C. Davatzikos, et al., Classifying Spatial Patterns of Brain Activity
with Machine Learning Methods: Application to Lie Detection, 28 NEUROIMAGE
663 (2005) (using a different method of data analysis to distinguish when
individual subjects were lying nearly 90% of the time, with a specificity of 90%,
sensitivity 85.8%).
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subjects were lying. 53 Using a greater field strength fMRI, they
performed a group analysis of the results and found increased
activation in five areas of the brain when subjects were lying, and
no increased activation when subjects were telling the truth. 54 In a
third study from 2005, the Kozel group developed a model that it
claimed could detect lying 90% of the time. 55
In anticipation of potential legal uses for this technique,
entrepreneurial neuroscientists launched two commercial entities
within the last 5 years. 56 In at least three cases, defense counsel has
attempted to introduce fMRI-based lie detection into evidence. 57 So
far, no one who has tried to introduce fMRI lie detection in court has
succeeded. Why then, should we be concerned about this use of
brain imaging? The reason for concern lies with the rationales for
exclusion, all of which could be surmounted in future cases, without
addressing the underlying limitations of the technology itself.
In United States v. Semrau, 58 a doctor accused of healthcare
fraud had proffered fMRI-based lie detection testimony to
demonstrate that he was telling the truth about his lack of intent to
commit fraud. The expert, Dr. Stephen Laken, the founder and CEO
of Cephos Corp., 59 and one of the authors of one of the Kozel studies,
53. See Kozel, et al., supra, note 21 at 295 (finding activation in three brain
areas under the lie conditions in a pilot study of eight subjects who were shown
five objects in each of two rooms, and told to tell the truth about objects in one
room, and lie about those in the other).
54. See F. Andrew Kozel, et. al., Brief Communications: A Replication Study
of the Neural Correlates of Deception, 118 BEHAV. NEUROSCIENCE 852 (2005)
(varying the conditions of the pilot study to conclude that brain activation
increased in lying but not in telling the truth).
55. See F. Andrew Kozel, et al. Detecting Deception Using Functional
Magnetic Imaging, 58 BIOLOGICAL PSYCHIATRY 605 (2005) (30 subjects used to
build the model were told to steal an object from a drawer and, in the scanner,
indicate what object they had stolen and instructed to deny taking any object
and told they would be paid $50 if their lie was not detected; then the model
constructed from their scans was applied to 31 different subjects, yielding lie
detection roughly 90% of the time, even when the subjects used self-constructed
countermeasures like pretending to themselves that they hadn’t taken the
object, thinking about some other location, or slowing their breathing).
56. No Lie MRI, according to its website, uses fMRI technology to determine
whether a scanned subject’s responses to questions are truthful.
http://noliemri.com/investors/MarketOpportunity.htm (last visited June 27,
2014). For a while, another commercial entity, Cephos Corporation, also offered
fMRI-based lie detection services. See Adam B. Shniderman, You Can’t Handle
the Truth: Lies, Damn Lies, and the Exclusion of Polygraph Evidence, 22 ALB.
J.J. SCI. & TECH. 433, 471, 471 n.256 (2012) (discussing the commercialization
of fMRI-based lie detection). Currently, however, its website advertises only
biotechnology assistance. http://cephos.com (last visited 6/27/14).
57. See, e.g., United States v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012)
(excluding defense expert fMRI-based lie detection testimony); Wilson v.
Corestaff Services, L.P., 900 N.Y S.2d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010) (excluding fMRIbased lie detection testimony).
58. 693 F.3d 510 (6th Cir. 2012).
59. The Sixth Circuit noted that Cephos “holds a patent on a version of an
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proposed to testify that the fMRI testing showed that the doctor was
generally truthful when he said he was trying to follow the correct
billing procedures. 60
Dr. Laken devised two sets of questions to pose to Dr.
Semrau. 61 One set of questions involved whether Dr. Semrau had
intentionally used incorrect billing codes, while the other set of
questions related to his separate billing for tests that should have
been included in regularly scheduled appointments. 62 After
practicing answering the questions on a computer, Dr. Semrau
entered the scanner, where he was asked the questions in random
order. 63 Dr. Semrau apparently passed the first set of questions
with flying colors, because Dr. Laken concluded that the results
showed that he was “not deceptive.” 64
On the second scan, relating to the testing charges, Dr. Laken
found that Dr. Semrau was “being deceptive.” 65 Attributing this to
fatigue, however, Dr. Laken devised a third set of shorter questions
relating to the billed tests and scanned again, this time in the
evening (the first two scans had been conducted at 6:00 a.m.). This
time, Dr. Laken concluded that Dr. Semrau was not deceptive. 66
During the evidentiary hearing, however, Dr. Laken conceded
that he could not tell whether Dr. Semrau was telling the truth
about any specific question in any of the three scans that he
performed. 67 This failure, the magistrate judge opined, meant his
testimony could not be helpful to the jury. 68 Moreover, by re-testing,
the magistrate was concerned that Dr. Laken had violated his own
protocols and questioned whether a fourth test would again show
Dr. Semrau being deceptive. 69
The trial judge excluded this testimony, adopting the
magistrate judge’s decision, based on Federal Rules of Evidence 702
fMRI-based lie detection method, which identifies Dr. Laken as its inventor.”
Semrau, supra note 20 at 516. According to the court, Cephos claimed to use
“state-of-the-art technology that is unbiased and scientifically validated . . . [and
to] have offered expert testimony and have presented fMRI evidence in court [as
well as providing] independent, scientific validation that someone is telling the
truth.” Id.
60. Id. at 515.
61. United States v. Semrau, 2010 WL 6845092 (W.D. Tenn. June 1, 2010).
62. Id. at *2.
63. Id. at *5. The expert explained this “practicing” as a way of getting Dr.
Semrau comfortable with the procedure. Id. Note, however, as discussed supra
note 20, each time a question is repeated, the signal will decrease, so
“practicing” will have the result of decreasing the signal.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at *7.
67. Id. at *7–8. See the discussion of timing in Part II, supra, explaining the
problem that the time lag inherent in the technology makes it impossible to
determine whether the answer to any specific question is being measured.
68. Id. at *16.
69. Id. at *13.
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and 403. 70 The Sixth Circuit upheld the exclusion. In deciding
whether Dr. Laken’s fMRI lie-detection testimony met the Daubert
standards, 71 the court found that “the underlying theories behind
fMRI-based lie detection are capable of being tested, and at least in
the laboratory setting, have been subjected to some level of
testing.” 72 The error rate and controlling standards of operation,
however, the court found more troubling. 73
Citing Dr. Laken’s own publications, and those of the Kozel
group, the court emphasized the small size of the studies (none had
included more than 30 subjects), the difference of laboratory
research scenarios from real world situations and for populations
other than the volunteers upon whom the studies were performed. 74
The court also was concerned that “different types of lies may
produce different brain patterns.” 75
The court therefore excluded Dr. Laken’s testimony, finding
that fMRI was “not ready to be used in real-world lie detection.” 76
In addition, it held that the evidence would violate Federal Rule of
Evidence 403, because the government had not been notified of the
testing, so that Dr. Semrau risked nothing in taking the tests
(because he would not have released unfavorable results), and
because Dr. Laken was unable to identify which questions Dr.

70. Federal Rule of Evidence 702 governs the admissibility of expert
testimony, while Rule 403 permits the judge to exclude relevant evidence if its
probative value is “substantially outweighed” by undue prejudice, confusion,
etc.
71. In Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), the
Supreme Court held that the Federal Rules of Evidence had superseded the
earlier general consensus test for expert admissibility, finding that standard
was “an austere standard, absent from, and incompatible with, the Federal
Rules of Evidence.” Id. at 589. Instead, the Court ruled that under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702, judges must “ensure that the evidence is not only relevant but
reliable.” Id. To do this, judges must make a preliminary assessment to
determine “whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is
scientifically valid and . . . whether that reasoning or methodology properly can
be applied to the facts in issue.” Id. at 592–93. Offering some flexible guidelines
(explicitly not to be used as a “checklist or test”), for making that assessment,
the Court proposed four factors: testability; peer review and publication; the
existence of methodological standards, including known or potential error rate;
and general acceptance. Id. at 594.
72. Id. at *10. This is not quite accurate, as noted in Part II, supra, because
many of the assumptions underlying the use of fMRI for lie detection have never
been tested, and we do not yet have the technology capable of testing them.
73. Id. at *11.
74. Id. (quoting Dr. Laken et al.’s publication, Mock Sabotage Crime, which
explained that none of the studies involved the level of jeopardy in a real
situation, nor whether fMRI deception testing would work for participants
taking drugs, outside the 18–50 year age range of the subjects, or who have
medical or psychiatric conditions).
75. Id. at *12 (quoting the Kozel group’s publication, Detecting Deception,
supra note 55).
76. Id. (quoting Detecting Deception, supra note 55).
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Semrau had answered truthfully or deceptively. 77
On appeal, Dr. Semrau challenged the finding that there were
no known error rates or controlling standards for the procedure. 78
Referring to the government’s biostatistics expert, who had
explained that there was “almost no data” about error rates in
circumstances like Dr. Semrau’s, the Sixth Circuit upheld the
magistrate judge’s rejection of the error rate testimony. 79 Noting
that error rates may vary in research and real world settings, the
Sixth Circuit also denied the second basis of Dr. Semrau’s appeal,
that the magistrate judge had erroneously created such a
distinction. 80 Quoting from Dr. Laken’s own work, the Sixth Circuit
observed that the distinction was widely recognized and that
researchers had cautioned about it. 81 Moreover, it questioned not
only whether fMRI lie detection had been tested in the real world,
but also whether it could be tested. 82
The Sixth Circuit, affirming the exclusion of Dr. Laken’s fMRI
lie-detection testimony, focused (in addition to the factors discussed
by the lower court opinion) on the fluctuating accuracy rates of the
research studies, a “huge false positive problem,” 83 and the absence
of research about statements regarding conduct that occurred long
before testing.
Dr. Semrau also appealed the magistrate’s Rule 403 holding,
arguing that the fMRI testimony, far from confusing the issues,
corroborated his testimony. 84 Because, however, the fMRI results
had been unable to corroborate any particular statement of fact, the
Sixth Circuit, noting that the jury was being asked to determine Dr.
Semrau’s culpability over a number of years, for dozens of discrete
acts, found little probative value in the proposed testimony. 85
In State v. Smith, 86 a murder trial, the defendant proffered
fMRI lie detection testimony to support his claim that he did not kill
his roommate. The trial court, analyzing the admissibility of this
testimony under Frye’s general consensus admissibility standard 87
and the state’s equivalent, Reed, 88 excluded it. Although the
77. Id. at *16. See discussion about the inability of fMRI technology to
measure activation from a single question because of the inherent time lag, Part
II supra.
78. U.S. v. Semrau, 693 F.3d 510, 521 (6th Cir. 2012).
79. Id. at 521.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 517–18 (noting that Dr. Laken contended that “people who are
telling the truth are deemed to be lying around sixty to seventy percent of the
time.”)
84. Id. at 524.
85. Id.
86. No. 106589C, Montgomery Cty Cir. Ct., MD (8/2012), on remand from 32
A.3d 59 (Md. 2011)
87. Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
88. Reed v. State, 283 Md. 374 (1978).
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defendant cited twenty-five peer-reviewed published studies,
performed by sixteen working groups, the court was not convinced
that the technique had achieved general acceptance in the scientific
community. Focusing on the “competing motions, expert
testimonies, and submitted articles,” the court found that they
“reveal[ed] a debate that is far from settled in the scientific
community.” 89 Accordingly, the court excluded the testimony.
Wilson v. Corestaff Services, L.P. 90 involved a lawsuit by a
former employee claiming that she had been fired in retaliation for
reporting sexual harassment in the workplace to her employment
agency. 91 The plaintiff had listed Dr. Laken as an expert witness,
and proposed to have him testify about the truthfulness of a key fact
witness through fMRI lie-detection testimony. The court declined to
admit the testimony, because the expert testimony could not meet
the threshold requirement of New York’s modified Frye test; i.e.,
that the testimony “would help clarify an issue calling for
professional or technical knowledge possessed by the expert and
beyond the ken of the typical juror.” 92 The court noted that the use
of fMRI to show a person’s past mental state or to gauge credibility
is far from generally accepted. 93 The court also held that because
“credibility is solely a matter for the jury,” the fMRI testimony must
be excluded. 94
These decisions illustrate two fundamental judicial concerns
with the use of fMRI lie-detection testimony. First, there is the
concern that such testimony invades the province of the jury to
determine credibility (a fundamental concern for many of the prior
polygraph cases). Second, there is the concern that the research,
whatever its scientific validity in the laboratory, does not generalize
to the relevant population.

IV. INVADING THE PROVINCE OF THE JURY
The idea that expert testimony commenting directly on
credibility invades the province of the jury has been a conceptual
problem for all lie detection evidence, including the polygraph. 95
89. Smith at *5.
90. 900 N.Y.S. 2d 639 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2010).
91. Id. at 640.
92. Id. at 642 (noting also that “New York courts permit expert testimony if
it is based on scientific principles, procedures or theory only after the
priniciples, procedures or theories have gained general acceptance in the
relevant scientific field”).
93. Id. (“even a cursory review of the scientific literature demonstrates that
the plaintiff is unable to establish that the use of the fMRI test to determine
truthfulness or deceit is accepted as reliable in the relevant scientific
community”).
94. Id.
95. See, e.g., United States v. Sheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) (observing that
polygraph testimony diminishes the role of the jury); U. S. v. Loaiza-Clavijo,
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Only one state (New Mexico) currently permits polygraph testimony
in court, and the majority of courts exclude expert testimony on
credibility. 96
Whether this is a legitimate concern depends on a number of
factors. First, invading the jury’s function as credibility assessor
would only be a problem if the jury takes the images literally and
does not understand the contingent nature of what these images can
reveal. 97 Will the jury do this? There has been little published
research on this aspect of fMRI lie detection. There is some evidence
that jurors are more convinced by neuroscience evidence than they
are by psychological testimony. 98 One meta-analysis study
examined the influence of neuroimaging testimony about intent on
mock juries deciding guilt and concluded that there was a “lack of
any impact of neuroimages on the decisions” of the mock jurors. 99
Juries do not appear to be over-awed by PET scans admitted to show
brain damage, since they still overwhelmingly convict.
Second, fMRI lie detection would only “invade” the province of
the jury if the jury were able to perform the task as well as any fMRI
expert. There is no evidence, however, that jurors are particularly
good at detecting deception. 100 Nearly everyone believes that they
are good at it, but the evidence is to the contrary. 101 Most people’s
credibility assessments—including people trained in micro-facial
expression and body language techniques—is only marginally
better than chance. 102 So if the jury’s credibility assessments are so
2012 WL 529981 (N.D. Ga.) at *6 (“polygraph evidence necessarily invades the
province of the jury”); U.S. v. Warner, 2014 WL 1373634 (N.D. Ga.) at *10
(determination of a witness’ credibility is within the exclusive province of the
jury).
96. See Daniel D. Langleben & Jane C. Moriarty, Using Brain Imaging for
Lie Detection: Where Science, Law, and Policy Collide, 19 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y
& L. 222, 226 (2013) (predicting that “courts will continue to be troubled by
testimony that comments directly on credibility”).
97. See Michael Pardo, Neuroscience Evidence, Legal Culture, and Criminal
Procedure, 33 AM. J. CRIM. LAW 301, 318 (2006) (contending that fMRI
testimony would not establish knowledge or lies directly, so that the jury would
still have to consider whether other evidence should override the test results).
98. See id.
99. N.J. Schweitzer, et al., Neuroimages as Evidence in a Mens Rea Defense:
No Impact, 17 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y AND L. 357, 382 (2011).
100. See, e.g., Max Minzer, Detecting Lies Using Demeanor, Bias and
Context, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2957, 2571 (2008) (discussing studies showing that
relying on demeanor evidence leads to accuracy less than half the time).
101. See C. Bond & B. DePaulo, Accuracy of Deception Judgments, 10 PERS.
SOC. PSYCHOL. REV. 214 (2006) (Most people, including professionals such as
lawyers, police, magistrates, and psychiatrists, can distinguish truth from lies
only 54% of the time—slightly better than chance).
102. See ALDERT VRIJ, DETECTING LIES AND DECEIT 67–69 (2000) (jurors are
not able to tell by observing witnesses which of them are telling the truth);
Joseph W. Rand, The Demeanor Gap: Race, Lie Detection, and the Jury, 33
CONN. L. REV. 1 7–14 (2000) (while subjects had strong beliefs about cues of
deception, these beliefs bore little relationship to reality).
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important to our justice system, they could use a little help. The
question then becomes whether technology might be able to assist
them, and that depends on the scientific validity of the technology.
As far as helping the jury with its credibility assessments, we
already permit evidence of an accused’s character for honesty, if
that character has been attacked, 103 and once a witness’s credibility
has been impeached, we permit credibility-bolstering testimony. 104
Recall that the most that Dr. Laken could say about Dr. Semrau’s
answers was that he was being generally truthful. It is unclear
whether this testimony would prejudice the jury in the face of
limiting instructions any more than would another witness
testifying that Dr. Semrau had the reputation for truth-telling in
the community. Even assuming a scientifically valid fMRI lie
detection method, it would invade the province of the jury no more
than what a live lay witness is already permitted to do. A jury is
still free to make its own determination about credibility, regardless
of witness testimony about honesty or truthfulness.

A. Scientific Validity
Scientific validity is a much more salient concern. In many
respects, fMRI lie detection appears far more scientific than many
forensic techniques widely admissible in court (take bite-mark
evidence, for example 105). It has many of the imprimaturs of science:
it is grounded on a technique—fMRI—with important uses outside
the courtroom; the research is conducted in the laboratory by
neuroscientists; and their studies are peer-reviewed and published.
As noted in Part III, however, that does not mean that the technique
can do what the experts advertise.
The courts, admittedly, have not been aware of many of these
issues. Instead, they tend to focus on generalizability and lack of
general consensus. The issues that they have raised are certainly
enough to cast doubt on the usefulness of fMRI for courtroom
purposes. But even supposing those defects in the technology were
curable (and cured), there remain fundamental problems with fMRI
lie detection.
1. Generalizability
The

Semrau

court

raised

two

primary

issues

with

103. Federal Rule of Evidence (FRE) 404(a)(1) permits evidence of an
accused’s character trait for honesty, but only after it has been attacked (usually
on cross-examination).
104. FRE 608(a) permits testimony about a witness’s reputation for
truthfulness (or an lay opinion about the witness’s truthfulness), but only after
the witness’s credibility has been attacked.
105. See, e.g., Erica Beecher-Monas, Reality Bites (discussing the lack of
scientific validity behind bite mark evidence).
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generalizability: the small numbers of test subjects within the
research studies and the artificiality of the tasks the research
subjects performed. Were these valid concerns? Small size is
certainly a problem for scientific studies, for reasons of replication,
diversity, and extrapolation to the general population.
The studies on which the fMRI-based lie detection was based
involved no more than thirty-one subjects. 106 The size of the study
matters in terms of precision of results and replicability. 107 Random
error decreases as the size of the study increases. Power, defined as
the probability that the study in which the hypothesis is being
tested will reject the alternative hypothesis when it is false,
increases with the size of the study. Replicability of small studies is
often a problem. As the Sixth Circuit noted, outside laboratories—
that is, those not engaged in fMRI lie detection—had not replicated
the studies cited by Dr. Laken. 108 The absence of replication appears
problematic for identifying a reliable protocol for real world
applications. 109
Small study size also decreases the diversity of the studies. The
subjects in most of the studies were convenience samples, that is,
student volunteers, mostly white right-handed males. No one tested
subjects with mental illness (a large proportion of those convicted of
crimes), people over fifty, children, or subjects taking drugs
(prescription or otherwise). These student subjects may have had
neither incentive nor opportunity to develop skill in deception. We
simply do not know if a more diverse population would yield
different results. 110
The courts’ second issue with generalizability—the artificiality
of the tasks the subjects performed—is also a valid concern. All the
experiments involved the researchers directing the subjects to tell a
lie. So did the fMRI measure brain responses to lying, or to following
researchers’ instructions to lie? Is it the question or the answer that
106. See Henry T. Greely & Judy Illes, Neuroscience-Based Lie Detection:
The Urgent Need for Regulation, 33 AM. J. L. & MED. 377, 396–402 (describing
twelve peer-reviewed articles published through 2007, three of which came from
the laboratory of Daniel Langleben and three published by Andrew Kozel’s
group).
107. See KENNETH J. ROTHMAN, EPIDEMIOLOGY: AN INTRODUCTION 75
(2012) (explaining that small size of trials “leads to imprecise results that may
not be replicable”).
108. See Greely & Illes, supra note 47, at 402 (noting the lack of replication
of the results by other laboratories and cautioning “never believe a result until
at least one investigator from outside the original group confirms it.”).
109. See Elena Rusconi & Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, Prospects of
Functional Magenetic Resonance Imaging as Lie Detector, 7 FRONTIERS IN HUM.
NEUROSCI. 1, 3 (2013) (observing that “it is very unusual to see a brain imaging
experiment precisely repeated within and between laboratories [which] may
prove especially problematic when trying to identify a well-known and reliable
protocol for potential applications in the real world”).
110. For a discussion of using unrepresentative groups in research studies,
see Henrich, et al., Most People are Not WEIRD, 29 NATURE 466 (2010).
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is activating the brain? Or, as we will discuss in Part III, is the brain
responding to something else entirely? The point is that the way the
brain works is quite complex and what is being measured may be
quite different from what lie detection researchers think they are
measuring.
Researchers have identified many different areas of the brain
activated during lying. Several studies have identified a network of
parieto-frontal areas that become significantly more engaged when
the subject is lying than when truth-telling. 111 This region performs
a host of other functions, so that it is not clear that this specific
region is involved in the process of lying, only that it was activated
when subjects were asked to lie. The limbic system may also be more
activated with lying than truth-telling. 112 The limbic system is
involved in emotion, but it is not clear if this system is active due to
deception, to the fear of being perceived as deceptive, or to
something else entirely. Just because the area is activated does not
mean that the subject is lying. 113 Lots of other things activate the
same areas.
Moreover, there is the question of consequences. Although
some subjects were told that they would be paid extra for
successfully lying, they all knew that there were no real
consequences in terms of reputation or retribution. They knew that
they were participating in an experiment and would go home at its
completion. In addition, they were not lying about very
consequential matters: a card’s identity or the location of some
hidden money or doo-dads. Would the results have differed if the
consequence of their answers had been arrest or conviction? We
simply do not know.
2. General Consensus
Whether fMRI is a valid tool for detecting deception is hotly
contested, at least among some neuroscientists. Even among those
engaging in fMRI lie detection research, there are debates about its
validity for courtroom uses. Obviously, the neuroscientists involved
in the start-up lie detection companies thought it was a valid
111. See Elena Rusconi & Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, Prospects of
functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging as Lie Detector, 7 Frontiers in Neurosci.
1 (2013) (reviewing the use of neuroscience imaging as lie detectors). Parietofrontal refers to brain regions in the parietal and frontal lobes; the parietal love
is located on the posterior and dorsal surfaces of the cerebrum, while the frontal
lobe is the most anterior lobe on the cerebrum. Id.
112. See J. Hakun et al., Toward Clinical Trials of Lie Detection with fMRI,
4 Soc. Neurosci. 518–27 (2009)(finding limbic system activation in ecologically
plausible scenarios).
113. See Rusconi & Mitchener-Nissen supra note 108 at 4 (explaining that
activation of parieto-frontal and limbic regions “does not imply in any
mechanistic way that a person is lying when the same region . . . activates
during a task”).
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technology, although the website of Dr. Laken’s firm, Cephos, no
longer advertises lie detection services.
In sum, the research is still far too premature for fMRI lie
detection to be useful in court. So far the courts have recognized
this, and rejected the technique. Some of these flaws could be
remedied with more basic research and better designed studies.
There are, however, much more fundamental questions about the
use of fMRI imaging for lie detection.

B. What is Deception?
One of the most crucial issues for fMRI lie detection is the
failure to define deception and to acknowledge the many kinds of
deception that exist. We do not yet have a precise model of the
mental processes involved in lying. 114 We may never achieve such a
model because, as discussed above in Part III, brain activity is
complex. Although the prefrontal, anterior cingulate, and parietal
regions have been identified as neural correlates of deception,
activity in these regions is an unreliable marker of deception. These
regions are responsible for executive processes that are not specific
to deception. 115
Deception involves both communication that is at odds with
physical reality and manipulation of another person’s beliefs. 116 The
deceiver must, therefore, conjecture about the other person’s
knowledge and state of mind. This is a sophisticated activity,
involving cognitive processes such as memory, reasoning, and being
able to assess the other person’s state of mind (sometimes called a
theory of mind). 117 Many areas of the brain are involved in these
processes.
The assumption underlying fMRI studies has been that
cognitive functions are located in focal brain regions, although that
is unlikely to be the whole picture, since most behavioral and

114. See Kamila E. Sip, et al., Response to Haynes: There’s More to Deception
than Brain Activity, 12 TRENDS IN COG. SCI. 127 (2008) (responding to Haynes
argument that the full spatial pattern of brain activity—so-called data driven
imaging—makes it unnecessary to detect deception in particular brain regions
by pointing out that his methodologies still “depend on the existence of
independent categorization of deceptive and non-deceptive intentions in each of
the subjects being scanned” as well as the subjects’ beliefs about the situation).
115. See Tatia M. Lee, et al., I Want to Lie About Not Knowing You, But My
Precuneus Refuses to Cooperate, 3 SCI. REP. 1 (2013) (noting that “activity in
these regions has not been a reliable marker of deception, likely because the
neural activity in these areas is not unique to deception”).
116. See Kamila E. Sip, et al., Detecting Deception: The Scope and Limits, 12
TRENDS COG. SCI. 48 (2008).
117. See id. at 1 (noting that deception is likely to require “the concerted
activity of several neural mechanisms, with activity in different, widely
distributed brain regions mediating the various processes underlying deceptive
behavior”).
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psychological processes are not located in a single brain center. 118
Neuroscientists debate about whether this matters in fMRI lie
detection. One camp argues that, for “data-driven” fMRI research,
all that matters is the “full spatial pattern of brain activity.” 119 The
other camp contends that there is no independent marker of
deception; that the data-driven imaging methodologies depend on
the “independent categorization of deceptive and non-deceptive
intentions in each of the subjects being scanned” and that the
subjects’ beliefs also affect their brain activity. 120 As noted in Part
II, we simply do not know what the activation means. Is it a
response to the question, or to the answer being formulated; is it
day-dreaming or anxiety or something else entirely? We don’t know.
1. Many Kinds of Lies
People can believe they are telling the truth but be factually
wrong. People can think they are lying but be factually correct.
Some people believe their own lies. Some intend to deceive. Some
lies are spontaneous and some rehearsed. Some lies concern recent
events and some concern events that happened long ago. Some
kinds of lies involve perception (have you ever seen this person—or
thing—before?). Some have important consequences and some do
not.
Deception is part and parcel of our social fabric. Every healthy
person lies—even babies learn to cry, mimicking pain or hunger,
when they want attention. We tell lies to others for a myriad of
reasons: to avoid hurt feelings; to lubricate social interactions; to
avoid responsibility; for personal gain. 121 It is unclear whether the
MRI scanner perceives the difference.
2. Many Kinds of Liars
Some people are more skilled at telling lies than others. 122

118. See Laurence R. Tancredi & Jonathan D. Brodie, 33 AM. J. L. & MED.
271, 275 (2007) (discussing the complexity of brain/behavior interfaces).
119. See John-Dylan Haynes, Detecting Deception from Neuroimaging
Signals—a Data-Driven Perspective, 12 TRENDS IN COG. SCI. 126 (2008)
(arguing that the computer-based classification algorithm identifies a unique
profile of activation that is indicative of deception).
120. See Kamila E. Sip, et al., Response to Haynes: There’s More to Deception
than Brain Activity, 12 TRENDS IN COG. SCI. 127 (2008).
121. See Greely & Illes, supra note 47, at 404 (noting that lies vary
tremendously and questioning whether the research is relevant to the kinds of
lies people tell in real life).
122. See W. Jiang, et al., A Functional MRI Study of Deception Among
Offenders with Antisocial Personality Traits, 244 NEUROSCI. 90, 91, 96 (2013)
(noting that “frequent lying made lying easier” and finding that in an fMRI
study of incarcerated men with antisocial personality disorders, brain activities
measurably decreased as the skill at deception increased).

684

The John Marshall Law Review

[48:651

Moreover, studies of college students may not generalize to people
that have had repeated brushes with the law, or to habitual and
skillful liars. 123 Increased skill at lying apparently results in
decreased detection in the fMRI. 124
Moreover, accomplished liars may be able to use countermeasures to evade detection. This has been an ongoing problem in
polygraph lie detection. When participants in fMRI studies used
countermeasures such as intentionally thinking about something
else, the success rate for distinguishing truth from lies decreased
dramatically. 125
People also vary widely in brain physiology. As discussed in
Part II, the structure and function of the brain (and in the blood
vessels supplying blood to the brain) are highly variable. People also
differ in terms of the mental processes involved in their behavior,
whether the behavior is lying, daydreaming, or writing poetry. 126
What is purportedly being measured in fMRI lie detection is the
average difference between two states: lying and truth-telling. We
do not really know if that is what is being measured, or if it is
something else that is responsible for the differences in blood
flow. 127 Further, because of individual variability, the most that can
be inferred is averaged information about the group being studied.
This poses a huge problem for use of fMRI technology in court,
where the focus is on the individual rather than the group to which
the individual belongs.
3. Many Situations
Not only are there many kinds of lies and liars, but situational
context is important. Neither deceivers nor truth-tellers respond
behaviorally the same way in all situations. 128 People’s behavior
123. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, BRAIN WAVES MODULE 4: NEUROSCIENCE AND
(2011) (noting that while experiments on college students may be a
necessary first step, they may not generalize to habitual and skillful liars).
124. See Jiang, et al., supra note 122, at 90 (concluding that “BOLD
activities during deception are correlated with the capacity to lie” and noting
that this “might challenge the diagnostic accuracy of lie detection”).
125. See Ganis G. Rosenfield, et al., Lying in the Scanner: Covert
Countermeasures Disrupt Deception Detection by functional Magnetic
Resonance Imaging, NEUROIMAGE 312–19 (2011) (detailing studies).
126. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, BRAIN WAVES MODULE 4: NEUROSCIENCE AND
THE LAW 13 (2011) (discussing the implications of individual variation for fMRI
lie detection).
127. See, e.g., Elena Rusconi & Timothy Mitchener-Nissen, Prospects of
Functional Magenetic Resonance Imaging as Lie Detector, 7 FRONTIERS IN HUM.
NEUROSCI. 1, (2013) (noting that to be used as lie detection, fMRI researchers
would have to be able to show that what is being measured is “actually evidence
of deception and not unrelated cognitive processes, and this would have to be
determinable for each and every response given by every future individual
undergoing fMRI questioning”).
128. See Kamila E. Sip, et al., When Pinocchio’s nose does not Grow: Belief
THE LAW 25
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depends on their emotional state, the complexity of the
communication, and their need to control the impression they make
on others. 129 All of this is not only highly individual, but is contextdependent. As the Semrau and Smith courts observed, because
fMRI experiments are just that—experiments—they lack the
emotional weight of real-life situations where the ability to deceive
may literally be life or death.
Belief in whether the deception can be detected may also affect
the signal that is being measured. In an fMRI experiment designed
to determine whether a person’s belief in the detectability of their
deception affected brain activity, Kamila Sip, et al., had
participants commit a theft of either earphones or a USB memory
stick. 130 They were told that if they lied without the lie being
detected, they could keep the object. They were then interrogated in
a scanner.
During some parts of the interrogation, participants believed a
polygraph lie detector was activated, and during some parts the
participants believed it had been switched off. The “lie detector” was
a fake. When the participants believed the (fake) lie detector to be
on, the brain activation was significantly greater when they were
lying than when they were telling the truth. When the participants
believed the (fake) lie detector to be off, however, brain activation
from both conditions was reduced, and they were not significantly
different from each other, implying that belief in detection affects
the fMRI signal. 131 The researchers concluded that the subject’s
belief in the efficacy of a lie-detection device matters.
In addition to belief in the efficacy of the lie detector affecting
the results, it may be that a subject’s belief in the lie itself may affect
the results. People accused of a crime may be able to convince
themselves of their own innocence. 132 This may, in turn, affect the
fMRI results. For example, in facial recognition experiments, when
the participants believed that they had seen a particular face before,
fMRI signals were comparable to when they actually had seen the

Regarding Lie-detectability modulates production of Deception, 7 FRONTIERS IN
HUMAN NEUROSCI. 1 (2013) (“Deception is inherently social[, involving] not only
the creation of a representation that is at odds with physical reality, but also a
manipulation of another person’s beliefs in a particular context”).
129. See A. Vrijl, et al., Cues to Deception and Ability to Detect Lies as a
Function of Police Interview Styles, 31 L. & HUM. BEHAV. 499 (2007) (discussing
factors that affect police officers’ interviewing accuracy).
130. See Kamila E. Sip, et al., When Pinocchio’s nose does not Grow: Belief
Regarding Lie-detectability Modulates Production of Deception, 7 FRONTIERS IN
HUMAN NEUROSCI. 1 (2013) (scanning experiment to detect differences in brain
activity when participants believed lies could be detected versus when they
believed they could not).
131. Id. at 6.
132. See THE ROYAL SOCIETY, BRAIN WAVES MODULE 4: NEUROSCIENCE AND
THE LAW 25 (2011) (raising this issue).
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face before. 133 In other words, the truth and lie conditions could not
be differentiated.
In sum, deception is a human social behavior. It is complex,
and like all complex human behavior, we do not yet know precisely
what the connections are to the brain, or how these connections
work. The technology is simply not there yet. Neuroscientists are
working away at this problem, but the answers are not yet in sight.
There is undoubtedly some connection between brain and behavior,
but identifying the specifics is still a distant goal. It is far too soon
to attempt to demonstrate that linkage through fMRI testimony in
court.

V.

OTHER COURTROOM USES OF FMRI

A. Criminal Cases: Linking Brain and Behavior
Neuroscience regarding the development of the adolescent
brain has had by far the most impact on the justice system. In an
important trio of cases, the Supreme Court held that because
adolescent brains were still developing, the Eighth Amendment
prohibited sentencing juveniles to death (Roper) 134 or to life without
parole (Graham 135 and Miller 136). These cases all relied to some
extent on fMRI studies. Notably, the neuroscience involved was
general evidence about brain development and the immaturity of
executive functions in adolescents rather than any attempt to link
brain activity with any particular behavior in any individual. In
addition, the inferences drawn from the neuroscience studies were
inferences about the group (adolescents) rather than about any
individual defendant.
The most common use of brain imaging has been in mitigation
at sentencing, especially in death penalty cases. Mitigation evidence

133. See Rissman et al., Detecting Individual Memories Through the Neural
Decoding of Memory States and Past Experience, 107 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI.
9849–54 (2010) (discussing experiments).
134. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005), involved an Eighth Amendment
challenge to state law permitting the execution of juveniles who were under
eighteen at the time of the crime. The amicus briefs of the American Medical
Association and the American Psychological association used neuroimaging to
argue that adolescents were categorically less blameworthy than adults and
therefore did not deserve the death penalty. The briefs, citing neuroimaging
research, contended that anatomical immaturity of adolescent brains was
related to behavioral immaturity. See Brief of the American Medical Association
et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper, 543 U.S. 551 (No. 03-633),
at 10; accord Brief of the American Psychological Association & Missouri
Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Roper, 543
U.S. 551 (No. 03-633) at 9.
135. Graham v. State, 560 U.S. __ (2010).
136. Miller v. State, 567 U.S. __ (2012).
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frequently involves brain scan evidence, primarily PET scans, 137
although fMRI testimony is becoming more common. Drawing
inferences about behavior from anatomical tools (like PET scans
and fMRI) are fraught with difficulties. Apart from the usual
problem of distinguishing correlation from causation, there is the
problem that multiple brain regions may be involved in a particular
function, and that multiple functions may be seen to activate a
particular region. Additionally, all the problems of individual
variation in brain physiology, lack of standardization of machines
and protocols, and the inherent subjectivity of the process of image
creation that are problematic in the use of fMRI for lie detection are
present in its use for mitigation.
Neuroimaging testimony is often admitted for mitigation, but
its effect on the outcome is questionable. The typical argument for
mitigation is that dysfunction in an area of the brain (usually linked
to the inhibition of violent impulses) diminishes a defendant’s
culpability. Thus, a life sentence is more appropriate than a death
sentence. 138 Juries, however, do not appear to be persuaded. 139
Despite the seeming futility of presenting neuroimaging
studies to the jury, appellate counsel have increasingly based
ineffective assistance claims on failure to perform fMRI testing on
the defendant. Some of these claims have even succeeded. 140
Curiously, judges may be more impressed with neuroimaging
testimony than juries appear to be. In one study, judges asked to
sentence a defendant in a hypothetical murder case gave 7% lighter
sentences when showed brain scans of the hypothetical defendant
than those judges who were not given the brain scans. 141
137. Positron emission tomography (PET) scans measure brain metabolism
(glucose and oxygen metabolism and cerebral blood flow. See Nora D. Volkow &
Laurence R. Tancredi, Positron Emission Tomography: A Technology
Assessment, 2 INT’L J. TECH. ASSESSMENT HEALTH CARE 577 (1986). It has been
around longer than fMRI, but it has a significant drawback: it requires the
injection of radioisotopes.
138. See O. Carter Snead, Neuroimaging and the “Complexity” of Capital
Punishment, 82 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1265, 1302 (2007) (discussing the use of fMRI
testimony in capital sentencing).
139. See, e.g., Hurst v. State, 147 So.3d 435 (Fla. 2014) (upholding death
sentence despite expert PET scan evidence showing brain abnormalities);
People v. Smith, 107 P.3d 229, 233–34 (Cal. 2005) (jury sentenced defendant to
death despite PET scans showing brain damage); State v. Reid, 2005 WL
1315689 (Tenn. Crim. App. 2005) (despite PET and MRI testimony showing
brain shrinkage in the defendant’s left temporal lobe, the jury sentenced him to
death); Ex Parte Simpson, 136 S.W.3d 660, 661, 665 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)
(sentencing defendant to death despite MRI and EEG testimony); Johnston v.
State, 841 So.2d 349, 353–55 (Fla. 2002) (death sentence despite expert PET
scan, EEG, and MRI testimony showing decreased frontal lobe activity). In a
recent Florida case, however, defense counsel was convinced that fMRI scans of
the defendant mitigated the sentence from death to life in prison.
140. See, e.g., Turner v. Epps, 840 F. Supp. 2d 1023 (S.D. Miss. 2012)
(granting access to fMRI expertise to support post-conviction petition).
141. See Benedict Carey, Study of Judges Finds Evidence from Brain Scans
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Defense counsels occasionally proffer expert neuroimaging
testimony to negate mens rea. To prove a crime, the prosecution
must prove that the defendant acted with the requisite level of
intent. 142 This mental state must be determined by the jury,
generally with little to go on other than circumstantial evidence. As
with fMRI lie detection, this testimony is rarely admissible.
Although PET scans have been offered as mens rea defenses in
fraud, 143 burglary, 144 and murder 145 cases, and fMRI will
undoubtedly be similarly proffered, in none of these cases was the
testimony admitted. Even where brain imaging has been admitted
for the issue of mens rea, it rarely persuades the jury. 146 Jurors are
apparently skeptical about the links between anatomical structure
and function and behavior.
As well they should be. The relationship between particular
structural abnormalities and specific aberrant behavior is far from
established. 147 Autopsies of people with severe behavioral
difficulties have shown minimal brain abnormalities, while
autopsies of people with severe brain damage have shown minor
behavioral effects. 148 This does not mean that there is no connection
between brain and behavior, only that the connection is complex
and not well understood.
There are also profound difficulties in demonstrating a
conclusive relationship between the function of any particular brain
region and any associated cognitive process. 149 A particular brain
region may serve many functions; conversely, many different
functions may activate the same region. 150 There is still no direct
Led to Lighter Sentences, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 16, 2012), http://www.
nytimes.com/2012/08/17/science/brain-evidence-sways-sentencing-in-study-ofjudges.html?_r=0 (reporting on study of judges sentencing a hypothetical
murderer).
142. The Model Penal Code requires proof of one of four mental states: acting
with purpose or intent; with knowledge; recklessly; or negligently. Model Penal
Code § 2.02 (1962).
143. United States v. Mevzinsky, 206 F. Supp. 2d 661, 663 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
144. People v. Herrera, 2003 WL 22962809, at *1 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).
145. Zink v. State, 278 S.W.3d 170, 177–82 (Mo. 2009).
146. See, e.g., People v. Kumar, 2014 WL 2203744 (Cal. Ct. App. 2014) (jury
convicted defendant of first degree murder notwithstanding expert PET scan
testimony showing brain damage).
147. See Tancredi & Brodie, supra note 117 at 288 (noting that “it is highly
inferential that the specific abnormal condition relates to a specific set of
behaviors”).
148. Id. (noting that EEG studies have revealed the same kinds of
discrepancies).
149. See, e.g., ORRIN DEVINSKY & MARK D’ESPOSITO, NEUROLOGY OF
COGNITIVE AND BEHAVIORAL DISORDERS 53–54 (2004) (explaining the difficulty
of isolating any particular process because of confounding by the subject
engaging in cognitive processes other than the one being studied as well as
confounding neural computations).
150. See id. at 54–55 (noting that if a “particular brain region is activated
by a cognitive process (evoked by a particular task), the neural activity in that
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mapping of mental function to specific areas of the brain. 151
Further, even if there is a connection between brain damage
and aberrant behavior, we cannot tell in which direction the
connection goes. Whether the observed behavior stems from brain
abnormalities or whether behavioral abnormalities affect the
structure and function of the brain is still unknown. 152 Thus,
inferences about specific links between brain regions and particular
behaviors are tenuous at best. The touted potential of fMRI to
provide objective insight into socially relevant behaviors remains to
be established.

B. Civil Cases
The predominant use of fMRI testimony in civil cases to date
has involved challenges to state statutes curbing the sale of violent
video games to children. 153 In these cases, defense experts proffered
the fMRI evidence to demonstrate a connection between watching
violent video games and aggressive behavior in children. Although
the testimony was admitted in these cases, the plaintiffs won on
First Amendment grounds, while the judges remained unpersuaded
about linking violent video games to aggression. 154
In personal injury cases, while fMRI testimony has not yet
made its way into reported decisions, PET scan testimony has been
successfully admitted to show brain damage, brain cancer and
dementia. Here, imaging techniques are on much more solid footing.
fMRI (like PET) is an anatomical tool, and it is quite useful in
clinical settings. fMRI testimony will probably find its way into
court in these kinds of cases, and as long as the issue is
anatomical—was the brain damaged? Where is the damage? What
is the extent of the damage?—it should have little difficulty with
admissibility. fMRI is an excellent anatomical tool. It is the attempt
to link brain activation with behavior that is premature.
brain region must depend on engaging that particular cognitive process . . .
However, this region may also support other cognitive processes”).
151. See Poldrak, Mapping Mental Function to Brain Structure: How Can
Cognitive Neuroimaging Proceed?, 5 PERSPECTIVES ON PSYCHOL. SCI. 753
(2011).
152. See Snead, supra note 137, at n.101.
153. See, e.g., Entertainment Software Ass’n v. Blagojevich, 404 F. Supp. 2d
1051 (N.D. Ill. 2005) (directing verdict for plaintiff’s despite defense expert
testimony that fMRI studies showed a link between aggressive behavior and
exposure to violent video games in adolescents); Entertainment Software Ass’n
v. Granholm, 404 F. Supp. 2d 978 (E.D. Mich. 2005); Entertainment Software
Ass’n v. Hatch, 443 F. Supp. 2d 1065 (D. Minn. 2006) (invalidating Minnesota
statute); Brown v. Entertainment Merchants Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729(2011)
(holding California statute unconstitutional); but see id. at 2761–71 (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (believing the statute constitutional based on neuroscience studies
showing a pattern of aggression after exposure to violent video games).
154. See Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 2741 (noting that the fMRI evidence was
neither compelling nor conclusive).
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VI. IF NOT FMRI, IS THERE A BETTER THOUGHT
DETECTOR?
The fact remains that MRI, fMRI, PET, and other diagnostic
tools are all anatomical methods that reflect some process distant
from actual, physiological brain activity. fMRI measures blood
oxygenation levels; PET measures metabolic changes. The
assumption made with these techniques is that these changes
reflect brain activity.
There are, however, methods that measure actual physiological
brain activity in real time. These are electroencephalography (EEG)
and magnetoencephalography (MEG). These methods both reflect
brain activity in the millisecond range. The EEG measures
electrical activity of thousands of neurons immediately beneath the
sensor or electrode placed on the scalp.
The EEG, however, has limitations. First, EEG signals can
only be measured from the cortex, leaving deep structures of the
brain unsampled. Second, the electrical signal emitted by cells in
the cortex is distorted by the tissue between the electrodes and the
brain. The hair and scalp, the bone and its structure, the brain
coverings (dura mater, arachnoid and pia mater), and the overlying
blood vessels (arteries and veins) all distort the electrical signals.
Third, the EEG only detects slow activity. The EEG amplifier
has high band pass filters that cut off very slow activity occurring
at less than once per second, and it has low pass filters that allow
only signals that have a slow rise time, cutting out very fast activity.
This filtering eliminates the detection of action potentials, so that
the EEG signal represents a narrow spectrum made up of slow
potentials generated by inputs to dendrites, rather than the action
potentials generated as a result of processing in individual cells.
This limits the EEG to frequencies of activity in the range of 0.5 per
second to 100 per second, too slow for action potentials whose rise
time is in the order of one one-thousandth of a second. These
limitations make the EEG a good clinical tool, like the MRI, but it
is not designed to detect real time action potential firing, only
membrane oscillations and dendritic potentials. As such, the
technique is not appropriate for measuring complex processes that
require real time (millisecond) discrimination, like responding to
questions, or identifying photos.
MEG is different. This is a very expensive technique but the
only one with the temporal resolution for real time brain physiology.
Magnetic sensors can calculate the magnetic signals generated by
brain cells. 155 MEGs contain superconductors that work only at very
155. Remember the “right hand rule” in high school physics? The magnetic
signal of an electrical event is perpendicular and flows to the right of the
electrical axis. This is the theory on which MEG is based.
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low temperatures, so that the MEG machine has the sensors
immersed in a bath of liquid helium. These sensors detect the small
magnetic changes.
The “cap” placed on the subject in MEG tests is actually a 60gallon hat filled with helium. The detectors pick up minute
magnetic signals from the surface of the brain. Because magnetic
fields are ubiquitous, the recording must be done in a specially
shielded room in order to isolate the magnetic signals to the
subject’s brain.
MEG also has limitations. First, it is costly, making it
available mainly for clinical uses, such as accurately plotting the
extent of tumors for surgery, and detecting the initial event in an
epileptic seizure, making surgery for epilepsy more accurate and
less likely to need follow-up surgeries. Second, subtle changes are
beyond current technology. The MEG signal must be extensively
analyzed to make it rise above noise levels.
A third limitation of MEG is that the mathematical analysis
and processing of the signals has as many decision points and
options for “tweaking” as fMRI. Because of the low signal to noise
ratio, averaging is required, along with prolonged recording times
and difficulties in determining causal events. In technical terms,
although not there yet, the MEG is improving and has advantages
in determining brain activity in relation to truth versus lying. At
present, such reliability and reproducibility is beyond the scope of
the method, just as it is beyond the capability of fMRI.

VII. CONCLUSION
Functional brain images—despite their appearance—are not
photographs of the brain. The signal measured is a characteristic of
blood rather than brain tissue. Poor temporal and spatial resolution
makes fMRI a crude representation of neural activity. Despite these
shortcomings, fMRI is a great tool for gaining clinical insight into
brain structure. fMRI is terrific for revealing areas of brain damage
and for surgeons mapping where to resect.
However, using this tool to make inferences about complex
human behavior is unwarranted. We make assumptions about the
link between blood oxygenation levels and brain activation, and
while these are good assumptions in clinical contexts, not much is
known about the links between brain activation, blood oxygenation
levels and behavior. 156 Deception is complex behavior. We know
very little about where it originates in the brain or how it is
manifested in action potentials and membrane oscillations.
This is a major problem for neurolaw. Lie detection, mitigation,
156. As one prominent neuroscientist posed the question, “Can one really,
truly understand how computers work by opening up a computer chassis and
probing the components with a heat gun?” Bandettini, supra note 19 at 31.
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and even the insanity defense all rely on causal links that have yet
to be established. To understand the brain and how it affects
behavior, a much wider context is needed. Physiological,
environmental and evolutionary factors undoubtedly play a part.
fMRI is an anatomical tool, not a behavioral tool. It is a great tool
for mapping brain structures and blood oxygenation levels. It
cannot, however, reveal our thoughts.

